WESTROOPER

Our boy Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal has a breaking piece on a new alliance between insurgent groups and al Qaeda in Pakistan.

This occurs of course as the US begins it’s mini-”surge” of forces into Afghanistan (which I guarantee you won’t last more than a year) and the recent “treaty” between Pak government at the militants allowing some areas to be governed by Sharia law (yeah, that’ll work).

So in the spirit of friendship, the Pak militants say “all hail al Qaeda”…Let’s just give diplomacy a chance. Mr. Holbrook, you want some more frequent flier miles?

The three senior most Taliban leaders in North and South Waziristan joined forces to wage jihad against Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US at the behest of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The new Taliban alliance said it openly supports Omar and bin Laden in its war against the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and South Waziristan leaders Mullah Nazir and Baitullah Mehsud put aside differences last week and created the Council of United Mujahideen. Nazir and Bahadar had feuded with Baitullah due to tribal disputes as well as Baitullah’s rising power at the senior leader of the Pakistani Taliban.

The three leaders had pamphlets distributed throughout North and South Waziristan to announce the formation of the Council of United Mujahideen. The Taliban leader “united according to the wishes of Mujahideen leaders like Mullah Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden,” The Nation reported.

The Taliban alliance “supported Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden’s struggle” against US President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administrations.

The new alliance said it was waging war “in an organized manner’” to “stop the infidels from carrying out acts of barbarism against innocent people” just as Omar and bin Laden were waging war against Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US.

The creation of the Council of United Mujahideen and their open support of al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban finally put to rest the Pakistani government’s claim that Bahadar and Nazir are “pro-government” Taliban. While Bahadar and Nazir opposed fighting the government for tactical reason they had openly supported al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

The establishment of the alliance also helps to consolidate the expanding network of Taliban, al Qaeda and Central Asian terror groups operating on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Analysts have claimed the Pakistani Taliban were a localized phenomena de-linked from the global jihad, despite Nazir’s open support for al Qaeda and the Taliban, the interconnections between the North Waziristan-based Haqqani Network and al Qaeda, and the establishment of Taliban-run suicide camps whose attendees conduct attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. The Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda’s joint paramilitary force that includes some Taliban forces, operates on both sides of the border.

The Pakistani government ceded North and South Waziristan to the Taliban after a series of peace agreements that began in 2004. The government attempted to restore its writ in 2007 and in early 2008 after the Taliban openly violated the agreements, but the military was defeated and agreed not to conduct operations in the region. Al Qaeda and a host of jihadi terror groups maintain training camps and safe houses in Waziristan.

– Christian

Tim ist ein Canadischer Soldat stationiert in Afghanistan. Er ist ein Logistic Officer und sieht deswegen nicht viel von der anderen Seite des “Wires”.

Er ist einer der Soldaten der Amy’s Brief erhalten hat und sich daraufhin bei uns gemeldet hat. Heute hat er wieder geschrieben, und was er geschrieben hat ist nicht gerade einfach zu verdauen.

Gestern Nacht gab es auf sein Camp zwei Raketenangriffe. Gott sei Dank gab es keinen Schaden und es wurde auch niemand verletzt aber Schlaf hat er deswegen keinen bekommen.

Alle halbe Stunde gab es Alarm und sie mussten in den Bunker bis die “All Clear” Nachricht kam. Dann sind sie wieder ins Bett gekrabelt. Tim hat einen Holländischen Roommate aber sprechen tun sie nicht viel miteinander. Der Holländer ist erst seit einer Woche da, vielleicht braucht er ja ein wenig um aufzuwärmen. Tim selbst scheint ein eher in sich gekehrter Mensch zu sein, zu uns allerdings ist er freundlich und offen. Das was er seiner Familie verschweigt, erzählt er uns.

Er meinte das die Familie schon Angst genug hat, da muss er sie nicht auch noch mit solchen Nachrichten belasten und genau dafür sind wir da, das wir ihnen das Leben etwas leichter machen, das sie uns das sagen können was sie ansonsten ihrer Familie nicht sagen können.
Ich glaube es ist sehr wichtig das Tim einen Gesprächspartner in uns beiden gefunden hat.

Ich glaube ich werde mich heute abend noch drann setzen und ihm einen von handgeschriebenen Brief schicken, die lieben die Jungs am meisten.

Wie hat Apollo es denn noch gleich ausgedrückt?

“Es liegt ein gewisser Charme in echten von Hand geschriebenen Briefen, nur Schade das kaum einer mehr die Kunst beherrscht sie zu schreiben.”

AgustaWestland has begun flying the pilot production version of its VH-71A variant of the AW101 for the U.S. presidential helicopter program. The helicopter, PP-1, was flown from the company’s Yeovil site in England on September 22. It is the first of five production aircraft that will be built under Increment 1 of the program, with 23 improved helicopters to be produced under the follow-on Increment 2.

Lockheed Martin, prime contractor for the VH-71 program, is installing the first mission systems in two Increment 1 test vehicles, TV-3 and TV-4, at its presidential helicopter integration facility in Owego, New York. Another two helicopters, TV-1 and TV-5, are continuing air-vehicle flight testing at the U.S Navy’s Patuxent River test center in Maryland.

The Navy’s first littoral combat ship, the Freedom (LCS 1), got underway for the first time on 28 July. The first ship of a program that seeks some 55 advanced-technology ships for operations in coastal/littoral waters, the Freedom is being constructed on Lake Michigan by a team led by the Lockheed Martin Corp.

The Freedom and the competitive design, led by the Independence (LCS 2) built by a General Dynamics-led team, are noteworthy in being more than a year behind schedule and costing more than twice as much as originally estimated. The contract cost of these ships was to be on the order of $220 million — plus the innovative “mission packages” that would be installed when they were ready for operations. The LCS 1 cost is now estimated at $550 million. And, it may be more before the ship is ready for delivery to the Navy later this year.

The delays and cost increases of the LCS program led to Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter cancelling the construction of LCS 3 and 4, to have been built by the Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics teams, respectively. The “mess” of the LCS program also led to the firing, reassignment, or resignation of several naval officers, including the Program Executive Officer for Ships, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition).

Subsequently the LCS 5 and LCS 6 were also cancelled in 2007 as the Navy sought to restructure the overall program. Under current plans, the Navy will procure:

Georgian tanks w/reactive armor roll into South Ossetia

Georgia has roughly 30k troops serving in the Georgian Armed Forces, with 2,000 of their best troops serving in Iraq. Though small, the Georgian Army is respected by their Coalition partners in Iraq as a highly competent fighting force. They’re equipped with relatively modern Russian weapons, to include some 200 tanks, 450 armored fighting vehicles, Su-25 and MiG-25 fighter jets, and a whole mess of artillery, mortars, surface to air missiles, etc etc.

The Russian bear is still, well… a juggernaut. Ivan’s armed forces weigh in at just over 1 million troops. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation suffered during the harsh post-Soviet breakup defense cuts, but have since flourished under Vladimir Putin. They are technologically advanced, disciplined, and effectively trained. The Russians are familiar and comfortable operating in the Caucasus Mountain region, both from their unification with Georgia under the Soviet Empire and from their fighting in nearby Chechnya.

So yeah, on the surface, it looks like we’ve got a classic David v. Goliath matchup. Not so fast. As mentioned, the Georgians can be mean little bastards. They’ve got a home field advantage, are furiously calling up reserves, and are fighting a Russian enemy that has one (one!!) supply line over the Caucasus into South Ossetia. That logistics line, ironically enough, will be closed in a few short months by Russia’s old tried and true ally — Old Man Winter.

If Georgia can plug that hole, get creative with their air defense assets, kill a whole mess of Russians, and force this thing into a winter overtime — I wouldn’t be surprised if the international community forces a peace favorable to the Georgians.

Of course if they don’t plug that line, I can see Russia’s tanks bringing Georgia back into the family — the old school way.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak is in town this week to discuss with White House and Pentagon officials what to do about Iran?s nuclear program. Accompanying Barak is Israeli Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz; he?s the former IDF chief who set off a firestorm recently when he said an Israeli military strike against Iran is ?unavoidable.? Current IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi was here last week and met with his Pentagon counterpart, Admiral Michael Mullen. Ashkenazi reportedly said he favors a diplomatic solution, but also issued the standard declaration that ?all options must be prepared? for stopping Iran?s nuclear program.

There has been considerable debate about whether Israel could even carry out an effective air strike against Iran?s nuclear program. Analysts say there are too many factories, labs and reactor sites dispersed too widely across the country. According to a 2006 paper published by two MIT doctoral candidates (one of the most thorough pieces of analysis available), it would be impossible for Israel to knock out the entire Iranian nuclear program but the target set could be narrowed to the most critical facilities. They identify the critical nodes as: the Esfahan uranium conversion facility, the gas centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility and the heavy water plant and future plutonium production reactors at Arak.

The MIT analysts identify Natanz as the most difficult target because much of the facility is buried deep and covered with layers of concrete. Israeli bombs would have to penetrate the earth covering, bore through the concrete layers and then dump enough bombs into the hole to generate blast pressures that could damage or destroy the equipment inside. They figure the strike package would have to drop a combination of roughly 24 BLU-109 2,000 lb. and BLU-113 5,000 lb. bunker busters on Natanz. The facilities at Esfahan are not buried and those at Arak are not hardened, so those targets sets would be relatively simple to destroy with no more than 24 2,000 pound GPS guided bombs.

What does Israel have as far as deep strike weapons? The MIT folks count at least 25 F-15I (the Israeli version of the F-15E Strike Eagle) and 20-50 F-16I, both airframes configured specifically for deep strike missions. Israel also has a large number of F-16s that could be fitted as strike aircraft, Wild Weasel jamming aircraft and over 40 F-15A and C versions to escort the bombers. Developments in precision targeting, specifically GPS guided bombs, means all Israeli aircraft carry bombs considerably more accurate than those used in the Osirak raid. They envision a 50 plane strike package evenly split between F-15I and F-16I aircraft.

Then the question becomes how well can Iran defend its airspace. Iranian aircraft are a mix of the old and the very old. Iran?s most modern fighter is the Mig-29, of which they have maybe 40. They also have a large number of 1970s era F-4, F-14, F-5 and some newer Chinese built F-7M and F-6. Iranian fighters would be operating over friendly territory, advantageous when they need to refuel or rearm. They could also draw on ground control radar to guide them into favorable attack positions against IDF aircraft roaming Iranian air space. If the Iranian aircraft could get into firing position against Israeli bombers, which is admittedly a big if, they have sufficiently modern air-to-air missiles that they could probably down a few.

It?s not Iran?s fighter jets that could pose the real challenge, as the Iranian air force is more of an ?antique show,? says David Ochmanek, an analyst with RAND who directs an ongoing study for the U.S. Air Force that examines future threats from Iran. The real threat to an attacker, he says, are Iranian surface-to-air missiles. There are reports that the Iranians field some of the newer Russian-built double digit SAMs, such as the SA-10, though not the newer and more potent SA-20 (the newer Russian designation is S-300 and S-400). The S-300 is considered by some accounts to be comparable to the U.S.-built Patriot air defense missile.]]>Ochmanek says the double digit SAMs are far more capable than the earlier SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. The newer systems have high powered radars that are difficult to jam and more powerful, faster missiles. Barry Watts, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington thinktank, and a Vietnam-era fighter pilot, says if pilots could spot the smoke trails of the earlier generation of SAMs they could outmaneuver them because of the G-force limitations of those older missiles. With the latest generation SAMs outmaneuvering doesn?t work. ?Those missiles went from ten G missiles, to about thirty or forty G?s,? which means the missile?s turn rates are vastly improved, he said. Coupled with the new powerful radars, ?if the missile is locked up on you and it?s guiding, the only thing you can do is pull the ejection handles and get out of the airplane.?

Iran has also reportedly bought the fairly sophisticated Tor-M1 SA-15 Gauntlet, a short-range mobile SAM system. The Tor M-1?s greatest strength is its mobility, which, because of Iran?s sizeable and mountainous terrain, could make for a very difficult target because it can pop-up almost anywhere. Iran lacks the resources to protect all of its air space, so it relies on ?point defense,? deploying its anti-aircraft guns and missiles around strategically important sites, Ochmanek says.

The MIT folks figured that to carry out an effective strike, twelve F-15Is would have to arrive over Natanz, six F-16I over Esfahan and five F-16I over Arak. Their analysis said that a 50 plane strike package would provide the Israelis significant attrition cushion. The paper?s authors note that to cause the operation to fail, Iranian air defenses would have to down close to 40% of the attacking Israeli jets, an attrition rate that would exceed even the disastrous U.S. raid on Ploesti in Word War II. The MIT analysts conclude that largely because of advances in precision weaponry, ?Israeli leaders have access to the technical capability to carry out the attack,? and that it would be no more risky than that of the 1981 raid on Osirak.

If a couple of students from MIT came up with that conclusion, the Israeli intelligence and military communities probably have a fairly high degree of confidence in the success of air strikes. The Israelis likely believe they can set back any progress the Iranians have made in nuclear enrichment by at least five years. What that would buy Israel and the rest of the world in terms of changing Tehran?s policies is anybody?s guess.

 

It’s a rifle designed specifically for the special operations community. Modular barrels, ambidextrous controls, a gas-piston operating system, a host of adjustment options — but you already know that.

So with all the slick marketing language and eye-popping specifications of the SOCOM Combat Assault Rifle, it’s a given that operators will embrace the thing wholeheartedly, right?

Well, let’s ask them.

“This rifle is awesome,” said one Special Forces operator who, like the rest of the Green Berets in this interview, declined to be named for security reasons. “It’s spot on.”

Now you get an idea of how the men who’ll use the weapon in combat felt about it, not just some six-figure marketing guru spewing crafty catch-phrases. But what’s most interesting is why they liked the rifle so much.

In an exclusive, Military.com joined a group of about a dozen special operations Soldiers from around the country who traveled to Northern Virginia this summer to test fire the SCAR before their upcoming deployment to the Middle East. Ground rules agreed to between the special operators, the rifle manufacturer and Military.com precluded naming the unit, its members or its deployment destination.

See the Military.com SCAR Demo Slideshow

The SCAR, which comes in a 5.56mm version and a 7.62mm one, is nearing the end of its field user assessment phase — the final stage before full-rate production and fielding to units under U.S. Special Operations Command, including SEALs, Green Berets and Air Force Special Tactics units.

The entry of the SCAR into the spec ops community comes as the services, Congress and the Pentagon scuffle over whether or not to replace the current M4 rifle and address persistent complaints over the standard-issued carbine’s reported lack of “stopping power” and its need for constant maintenance and cleaning to avoid jams.]]>But ask the special operations troops firing both the Mk-16 (the 5.56mm version of the SCAR) and the Mk-17, its 7.62mm brethren, and you’ll get a completely different response on the rifles’ advantages over the venerable M4.

To these hardened commandos, the issue wasn’t the new carbine’s gas-piston system that many experts agree causes fewer stoppages than the all-gas operated M4 — they keep their weapons in tip top shape. Instead, some operators appreciated how well the SCAR felt with lead pouring from its muzzle.

“I like it a lot better than the M4,” one special operator said after firing a magazine full of 5.56mm through the Mk-16. “There’s a lot less recoil.”

One Special Forces Soldier applauded the weapon’s controls, with safety latches located on both sides of the receiver and situated much closer to the weapon’s handle.

“This works better with my stumpy hands,” the stocky operator joked.

But by far the feature that most impressed these operators was the SCAR’s ability to change from something as small as a submachine gun to a weapon with the reach of a sniper rifle.

Like many competitors to the M4, both the Mk-16 and Mk-17 can be outfitted with barrels ranging from 10 inches for close-quarters battle operations to 18-inch designated marksman barrels.

“That’s the best part of this weapon,” explained one Special Forces Soldier. “When we deploy, we usually go with just our M4s. But if we’re on an operation where we need an overwatch or we’re observing at a distance, the M4 doesn’t do us much good until it’s too late.”

With the SCAR, the NCO said, the team could have both the reach and protection of a long gun and the maneuverability and portability of an assault rifle — all in one.

Both the Mk-17 and Mk-16 have a fully adjustable stock that can be folded to the side to shrink the carbine into the length of a submachine gun. Some of the operators at the test shoot gave the stumpy rifle a try in this configuration, but marksmanship was mixed.

“I’m not sure I’d ever want to fire it like this,” one operator said after shooting the Mk-17 with its stock folded. “But it’d sure be nice to fold it up like this for transporting in a vehicle or something.”

Officials with FN-USA say that U.S. Special Operations Command has ordered about 18,000 SCAR variants for commandos and a limited run of about 1,200 rifles has already begun.

It’s unclear still whether these Special Forces Soldiers will be slinging lead down range with a SCAR pinned to their shoulder on their next deployment, but judging by the pile of spent casings littering the ground during their demo shoot, some of them wouldn’t complain if the new rifle wound up in their armory.

The first Boeing CH-47, a 33,000lb machine powered by two 1,640shp Lycoming (now Honeywell) T55 engines, achieved first flight on Sept. 21, 1961.

Nearly 47 years and seven major upgrades later, the CH-47F and MH-47G has doubled in weight to 50,000lb, while the engine shaft horsepower rating has tripled with introduction of the 4,868shp T55-GA-714 powerplant.

With only 10% of the CH-47F delivered, however, Boeing is again proposing to radically increase the size of the airframe. The “growth Chinook” would be stretched and widened to accommodate and up-armored HMMWV (Humvee) inside the cabin. This would increase maximum takeoff weight to around 70,000lbs and demand a much larger engine. Honeywell has already proposed a roughly 6,000shp T55-GA-715.

It’s still unclear what the army thinks about all this. After all, the army is planning to buy another 400 CH-47Fs. It’s also still debating how much it needs a Joint Heavy Lift rotorcraft that would be more than twice the size of the CH-47F.

On top of all this, the army has also started a program to replace the venerable T55 with an all new engine in the 6,000shp to 7,000shp range after 2018. Last week, I confirmed that Honeywell, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric are each participating in the earliest stages of the Future Affordable Turbine Engine (FATE) program.]]>All this really means is that no one can predict the future of the army’s heavylift rotorcraft needs after 2015, when the Future Combat System will allegedly be fielded. When the future of FCS is finally settled, the army will have a range of good options for a Chinook replacement.

Während ich auf den Einberufungsbescheid noch warte, habe ich Anfang der Woche ein Schreiben von meinem zukünftigen Bataillionskommandeur erhalten.

Wirklich Neues habe ich dadurch nicht erfahren. Lediglich einige Termine waren für mich interessant: Am ersten Wochenende wird vermutlich Dienst stattfinden und der Offizierlehrgang / die Grundlagenausbildung wird Mitte Dezember diesen Jahres für mich enden.

Ansonsten muss ich allerdings sagen, dass das Schreiben insofern gelungen ist, als dass es seinen wohl gewollten Zweck erfüllt, nämlich bei dem Adressaten eine postiven Grundeinstellung hinsichtlich des Dienstantritts zu erzeugen.

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Gespannt bin ich außerdem auf die Ergebnisse des schriftlichen Abiturs. Die entsprechenden Zensuren werden mir nächste Woche bekannt gegeben.

While no “final” decision has been revealed, the indications “inside the Beltway” are that the Navy’s long-gestating DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer program will end with only two ships. Indeed, there are also rumors that even those two ships will not be constructed.

Contracts have already been awarded for the first two destroyers — authorized in the fiscal year 2007 budget — to General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (Maine) and to Northrop Grumman (Pascagoula, Mississippi). Originally the Navy planned a class of 32 of these DDGs, but, as previously reported here, last year the Navy cut the program to seven ships, although the 32-ship requirement was still “on the books.”

The Navy’s leadership, both uniformed and civilian, has been lackluster in its support of the DDG 1000 class. Indeed, the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, when recently asked by Congress what he believed the new ships’ most important feature would be, he told of the reduced manning for the ships.

The new “destroyers” are to have a full-load displacement of almost 15,000 tons and an overall length of 600 feet — the dimensions of a cruiser by most standards. Armed with two 155-mm rapid-fire guns (with a range of more than 75 miles firing guided projectiles) and 80 Standard and Tomahawk missiles or their equivalent, and fitted with a large manned- and unmanned helicopter facility, the ships would be highly capable, multipurpose units.

The price has become a “deal breaker” for some involved in the shipbuilding process. The Navy estimates that the first two ships will cost $3.3 billion each, with follow-on ships to cost $2.5 billion. This compares to the last of the 62 Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) destroyers having a cost some $1.2 billion each.

]]>The most likely, near-term alternative to the DDG 1000 is to resume construction of the Burkes. The Navy now has 62 in the fleet and under construction. The former CNO, and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has declared repeatedly that the Navy does not need additional Burke-class ships. And, restarting that line and updating the ships would give them a pricetag of about $2 billion each. (The Burke original design dates from 1979.)

Further, according to Navy data, even building two Burkes per year, and dividing the buy between the two shipyards, would probably not enable keeping the Bath Iron Works yard in business.

The lack of Navy support for the DDG 1000 is seen by some observers as a rationale for accelerating the Navy’s next surface combatant, the CG(X) missile cruiser, which would be optimized for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) role. This seems ironic because there was no Navy requirement for the DDG 1000 to have that role, although her new-design radars could certainly have been developed with that capability. Of course, even after the ships are completed their radars/fire control systems could be upgraded for the BMD role. That is exactly what is being done now for the Aegis cruisers of the improved Ticonderoga (CG 47) class and for the Burke-class destroyers.

Further, the CG(X) is getting significant support in Congress, especially from Representatives Gene Taylor (D-MISS) and Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), who want that ship to be nuclear propelled. They have even proposed a new generation of Burke-class ships with nuclear propulsion! Both proposals are ludicrous when one looks at the percentage of U.S. oil consumption by the Department of Defense (less than 2 percent) and the percentage of that which is used to drive U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships (about 8 percent). Considering the additional cost to design and construct nuclear-propelled ships; adding the cost of recruiting, training, and retaining nuclear-qualified personnel; and including disposal costs of those ships, and the idea does not hold water.

Further, the basic DDG 1000 design could become the CG(X) — obviously not CG(X)N — with only modifications to the ships’ radar/fire control systems. The ships have a significant growth margin and deleting the two 155-mm guns could provide space for additional missiles or other advanced features.

The DDG 1000 is not, in this writer’s opinion, the best surface combatant that could have been produced at this time. But considering the time and dollars that have been invested in developing the DDG 1000 design and the ship systems, and the Navy’s need for additional surface combatants, the DDG 1000 is far, most superior to the alternatives available.